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Abstract
We have evaluated the optimal secrecy rate for Amplify-and-Forward (AF) relay networks with multiple eavesdrop-
pers. Assuming i.i.d. Gaussian noise at the destination and the eavesdroppers, we have devised technique to calculate
optimal scaling factor for relay nodes to obtain optimal secrecy rate under both sum power constraint and individual
power constraint. Initially, we have considered special channel conditions for both destination and eavesdroppers,
which led us to analytical solution of the problem. Contrarily, the general scenario being a non-convex optimization
problem, not only lacks an analytical solution, but also is hard to solve. Therefore, we have proposed an efficiently
solvable quadratic program (QP) which provides a sub-optimal solution to the original problem. Then, we have
devised an iterative scheme for calculating optimal scaling factor efficiently for both the sum power and individual
power constraint scenario. Necessary figures are provided in result section to affirm the validity of our proposed
solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently a significant amount of research is going on to ensure secure communication in wireless networks. Due
to broadcast nature of wireless transmission, the transmitted messages can be intercepted by eavesdroppers. Though
cryptographic security can be used to counteract eavesdropping, but secrecy measure of such scheme relies on the
computational complexity of cryptographic functions rather than information theoretic principles. Also, distributing
secret key across the network has its own overhead. On contrary, physical layer security schemes exploit the inherent
randomness present in the wireless channel and provide information theoretically provable secure communication
irrespective of the computational capability of the eavesdropper(s).
Physical layer security came to existence when Wyner in a seminal paper [1] showed that a non-zero secrecy rate is
possible for a discrete memoryless channel if the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded. Following his work researchers
have evaluated secrecy capacity and equivocation region of Single antenna and Multi-antenna systems. However,
resource constrained multi-hop networks have not got enough attention though they are practically significant.
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2In a multihop wireless network, intermediate relay nodes have to follow certain relaying strategy for forwarding
packets to the next relay or destination. Amplify and forward relaying scheme is simplest among them where
each node transmits the message it has received after amplification (scaling). Though simplest in nature but the
significance of this scheme lies in its low cost implementation and effectiveness against fading. Nevertheless, from
theoretical point of view study of such a relaying scheme can help us to estimate lower bounds of the channel
capacity of other communication scenarios (e.g. Analog Network Coding). Very recently, researchers have started
investigating the significance of amplify and forward relaying for attaining physical layer security [15, 16].
In our paper we consider a scenario where relay nodes uses amplify and forward relaying to convey the source
message to the destination. However, due to the presence of one or more eavesdropper secrecy of communication is
in jeopardy. For such a scenario secrecy rate of the network provide a good measure of performance of the system.
Unlike some previous works where only total relay power constraints is assumed, we consider the individual relay
power constraint also. In practice the relay nodes are generally powered by their individual power source without
any means to share their power sources (e.g. battery). Therefore, individual relay constraint is more relevant in
practical situations and general. Assuming the availability of global channel state information (CSI), we consider a
two hop network consists of a single source, a single destination and multiple relay nodes. As each of the relay node
connects the source and destination separately, they form a diamond like structure and hence named accordingly. We
begin our analysis with a symmetric diamond network and provide the analytical solution for optimal scaling factor
of relay nodes. We then relax the symmetric network assumption and analyze the scenario where eavesdropper’s
channel vector is scaled version of receiver’s channel. For general case where multiple eavesdroppers are involved
we have multiple secrecy rate corresponding to each eavesdropper and the objective would be to maximize the
minimum of them over the same constraint set. In our paper, we provide a sub-optimal solution for individual relay
constraints, whereas we propose an iterative algorithm for secrecy rate in case of sum constraint and individual
constraint.
We summarize our contribution as follows:
• For symmetric diamond network we provide analytical solution for secrecy rate.
• We discuss and analyze a step-by-step procedure for calculating optimal secrecy rate when eavesdropper’s
channel vector is scaled version of receiver’s channel.
• For general case we discuss the sub-optimal “zero-forcing” solution for individual relay constraint. There we
reformulate the optimization problem as a quadratic program which can be solved efficiently.
• We propose an iterative algorithm for obtaining optimal secrecy rate for sum relay and individual constraint
scenarios.
Organization
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we survey the related work. The system model and notations are
introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we analyze the secrecy rate for several channel conditions of receiver and
3eavesdropper. We illustrate numerical results of the formulations in Section V. We conclude our paper in Section
VI with a brief summary and possible future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
Amplify and forward scheme was introduced by Schein and Gallager [2] and was considered as a mean of
cooperative communication by [3], [4], [5]. Later several researchers have reported that cooperative scheme like
amplify and forward not only provides robustness against channel variations but also ensures non-zero secrecy
rate in certain scenarios where otherwise it is zero. For example, if the source to destination channel is poor as
compared to source to eavesdropper channel, then by using appropriate scaling factor in relay nodes we can cancel
out the received signal at eavesdropper and thereby improve the secrecy rate. As we have assumed gaussian channel
model it is worth mentioning that the secrecy capacity for Gaussian Wiretap channel was evaluated by Cheong and
Hellman [6]. Later the effect of fading on gaussian wiretap channel model was analysed by [7] and [8]. The wire-tap
model in context of multi-antenna system was considered and analysed by [9], [10], [11] and [12]. But both the
single and multi-antenna system were limited to single-hop network. As the multi-hop wireless networks are equally
significant, so recently research in this area has got a good pace. Lai and Gamal [13] evaluated the secrecy capacity
of relay-eavesdropper channel for different cooperative schemes and also evaluated corresponding equivocation
region. Authors in [14] reported the improvement in physical layer security with the help of cooperating relays.
Same authors later elaborated the significance of amplify and forward scheme for attaining physical layer security
in [15]. But in their work they considered total relay constraint criteria and provided bounding results for secrecy
capacity. For multiple eavesdroppers scenario they suggested the “zero-forcing solution” where by beam-forming
the transmitted signal is nullified at each eavesdropper. The more practical individual relay constraint criteria was
considered in [16], [17]. The authors of the both the papers provided an iterative algorithm for calculating the
optimal amplification vector for relay nodes for maximizing secrecy rate using semi-definite relaxation. Our work
discusses the special cases of the model considered in [17] and investigate the nature of the solution for those
special cases. Our approach significantly differs from the techniques used in [16] and [17] as we have converted
our problem into a convex optimization problem by using a noble transformation of variables. Further we discuss
the convergence of the solution to the global optimum. Infact we identify that for certain special cases we can
evaluate the optimal scaling factor analytically. Those analytical results are motivated from [18] and [19], where
authors have devised schemes to find the optimal amplification vector for attaining the capacity of amplify and
forward network under individual relay constraints in absence of secrecy criteria.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model consists of a single source, a single destination, M relay nodes and eavesdroppers as shown
in figure 1. The channel gain from source node to the ith relay node is denoted by a real constant hs,i. Similarly
channel gain from the ith relay node to destination or to eavesdropper is denoted by hi,d and hi,e, respectively.
Now, if we consider discrete time instants and neglect the transmission delays, then signal received at each relay
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Fig. 1. Simple AF network with multiple (K > 1) eavesdroppers
node due to the source can be expressed as:
yi[n] = hs,ixs[n] + zi[n] (1)
where xs[n] is the channel input at time instant n and zi[n] is the noise at relay ith node. We assume that
{zi[n]},−∞ < n < ∞ forms an i.i.d. sequence of Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ2,
i.e. zi[n] ∼ N (0, σ2) which is independent of the input signal at that receiver. In case of AF scheme each relay
node scales its received signal before transmitting. The maximum scaling factor is determined by the individual
power constraint of relay node and the received signal power at that relay node. We assume a power constraint
over transmitted signal from each node which can be expressed as:
E[x2i [n]] ≤ Pi, −∞ < n <∞, i ∈ {s, 1, 2, . . . ,M}
So, transmitted signal from each relay node can be written as:
xi[n+ 1] = βiyi[n], −βi,max ≤ βi ≤ βi,max where β2i,max =
Pi
h2s,iPs + σ
2
(2)
Now, we can express the received signal at destination and eavesdroppers in following manner:
yd[n] =
M∑
i=1
hi,dxi[n] + zd[n] (3)
yk[n] =
M∑
i=1
hi,kxi[n] + zk[n] (4)
Here zd[n] and zk[n] are mutually independent i.i.d. random variables distributed according to N (0, σ2) and also
independent of zi[n]. For the layered network shown in figure 1 both source signal (xs[.]) and noise signals (z(.)[.])
arrive at destination or eavesdropper traversing different but same respective delayed path. Therefore, the received
signal at destination and eavesdroppers are free of intersymbol interference. So, we can omit the time indexing and
use equation (1), (2) and (3) to write the following expression.
yd =
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,dxs +
M∑
i=1
βihi,dzi + zd (5)
5In similar manner the received signal at eavesdropper can be written using equation (1), (2) and (4).
yk =
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,kxs +
M∑
i=1
βihi,kzi + zk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · ·K} (6)
The secrecy rate at destination for such a network model can be written as [1]:
Rs(Ps) = min
k
[I(xs; yd)− I(xs; yk)], k ∈ {1, 2, · · ·K} (7)
where I(xs; y) represents the mutual information between random variable xs and y. Secrecy capacity is defined
as the maximum achievable secrecy rate over all the distribution of source symbol and scaling vector β. Now, due
to [6] we know that secrecy capacity is attained for Gaussian channels when the inputs are distributed according
to N (0, Ps) where E[x2s] = Ps. Therefore, optimal secrecy rate can be written as following optimization problem.
R∗s(Ps) = max
β
min
k∈{1,2,...,K}
[Rd(Ps,β)−Rk(Ps,β)] (8a)
= max
β
min
k∈{1,2,...,K}
[
1
2
log (1 + SNRd)− 1
2
log (1 + SNRk)
]
(8b)
where SNRl =
(
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,l
)2
1+
M∑
i=1
(βihi,l)2
Ps
σ2 .
If we use the following vector and matrix notations then SNR at destination or eavesdropper can be represented
as
SNRl =
(
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,l
)2
1 +
M∑
i=1
(βihi,l)2
Ps
σ2
=
(hs,l
tβ)2
1 + βtdiag(hl)β
Ps
σ2
(9)
where hs,l = [hs,1h1,l, hs,2h2,l, · · · , hs,MhM,l]t
diag(hl)=

h21,l 0 · · · 0
0 h22,l · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · h2M,l
 and l ∈ {d, 1, 2, · · · ,K}
IV. SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
A. Special Cases
1) Symmetric Network: We consider a M relay node symmetric network with single eavesdropper. By symmetric
network we mean that the channel gain from source to all the relays are equal, i.e. hs,i = hs,j = hs, ∀i, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,M}. Same is true for the respective channel gains from any relay node to destination and relay node
to eavesdropper; we denote them by hd and he, respectively. This kind of scenario can occur in real world if the
relay nodes are co-located i.e. relay nodes are quite close to each other or if there is a single relay with multiple
6antennas. For such a network model secrecy rate can be written as:
Rs(β) =
1
2
log
1 + γ′s
(
M∑
i=1
βi
)2
ν+
M∑
i=1
β2i

1 + γ′s
(
M∑
i=1
βi
)2
µ+
M∑
i=1
β2i

(10)
where γs = Psσ2 , γ
′
s = hsγs, ν =
1
h2d
, µ = 1h2e
Proposition 1. For symmetric M relay node network optimum β values are all equal, i.e. β∗1 = β∗2 = · · · = β∗M .
Proof: By taking derivative of Rs with respect to βi, we get
2γ′s
( M∑
j=1
βi
)(
µ−ν
){( M∑
i=1
β2i −βi
( M∑
j=1
βj
))(
2
M∑
i=1
β2i +ν+µ
)
−
( M∑
i=1
β2i
)2
−γ′sβi
( M∑
j=1
βi
)3
+νµ
}
= 0
Now, as
(
M∑
j=1
βi
)
= 0 is not the optimal solution and µ 6= ν, hence
 M∑
i=1
β2i − βi
 M∑
j=1
βj
(2 M∑
i=1
β2i + ν + µ
)
−
(
M∑
i=1
β2i
)2
− γ′sβi
 M∑
j=1
βi
3 + νµ = 0 (11)
Similar equation can be obtained if we take derivative with respect to βj , j 6= i and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Subtracting
this equation from equation (11) we get
(βi − βj)
(
M∑
j=1
βj
)
(
2
M∑
i=1
β2i + ν + µ
)
+ γ′s
(
M∑
j=1
βi
)3 = 0 (12)
Hence, βi = βj , i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
Corollary 1. Optimal solution of equation (10) can be attained by solving the following optimization problem
max
β
(
1 + Psσ2
M2β2h2sh
2
d
1+Mβ2h2d
)
(
1 + Psσ2
M2β2h2sh
2
e
1+Mβ2h2e
)
β∗AF =

[
σ2
PRM2h2dh
2
r
]1/4
β
1/2
max,
σ2
PRβ2max
< M2h2dh
2
e
βmax, o.w.
Proof: As the optimal solution corresponds to equal values of βi’s, so replacing them by β in equation (10)
we get the above expression. Now it is easy to see that if we introduce the following parameters: hsr =
√
Mhs,
hr,d =
√
Mhd and hr,e =
√
Mhe then the above problem become single relay secrecy rate maximization problem.
So, we can use the solution of that problem which can be calculated easily.
7B. Asymmetric Network with he = αhd
For sake of analysis we consider a new variable ωi = hi,dβi, its upper bound ωi,max = hi,dβi,max and a new
parameter gs,i =
√
Ps
σ2 hs,i, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}. Therefore, secrecy rate expression can be written as:
Rs =
1
2
log
1 + ( M∑i=1 gs,iωi)2
1+
M∑
i=1
ω2i

1 + α2( M∑i=1 gs,iωi)2
1+α2(
M∑
i=1
ω2i )

It is easy to see that non-zero secrecy rate can be obtained only if α < 1. If we denote
2∑
i=1
ω2i = r
2 then the above
expression can be written as: 1+%1Ψ(ω)1+%2Ψ(ω) , where Ψ(ω) = (
2∑
i=1
gs,iωi)
2, %1 = 11+r2 and %2 =
α2
1+α2r2 . It is easy to
see that as α < 1, so %1 > %2 and therefore the expression
1+%1Ψ(ω)
1+%2Ψ(ω)
will be maximized when Ψ(ω) is maximum.
Individual Constraint: To maximize Ψ(ω) we formulate following optimization problem.
max
(
M∑
i=1
gs,iωi
)2
s.t.
M∑
i=1
ω2i = r
2
One can easily calculate the optimal ω vector which is equal to gs||gs||r. By replacing this in the secrecy rate equation
along with the sum constraint we can formulate following optimization problem in r:
max
r
1 + ||gs||
2r2
1+r2
1 + α
2||gs||2r2
1+α2r2
The solution to this problem is r∗ = 1√
α
√
1+||gs||2
. Now, if gs||gs||r
∗ satisfy individual constraints of ωi then this is
the optimal solution, else we move to next step. This case considers the scenario when the solution obtained using
above method violates any of the ωi’s constraints.
We arrange ωi’s according to
gs,i
ωi,max
and denote them as ω(1) ≥ ω(2) ≥ . . . ω(M). We follow the same ordering
for gs,i’s also and denote the ordered values as gs,(i). Let us assume that the individual constraint is violated upto
mth ordered variable. As the m variables have violated their constraints we can replace them by their individual
upper bound, whereas, for the rest of the variables we still need to find their optimum values. Now we introduce
some notations for the analysis in the next section.
pm =
m∑
i=1
gs,(i)ω(i),max
qm =
m∑
i=1
ω2(i),max
sm =
M∑
i=m+1
g2s,(i)
Following the argument presented in [18] we can easily upper bound those variables.
8gts,{(m+1),·,(M)}ω{(m+1),·,(M)} ≤ gts,{(m+1),·,(M)}λmgs,{(m+1),·,(M)}
for all ||ω{(m+1),·,(M)}|| =
√
r2 − qm
where u{(m+1),·,M} = [u(m+1), · · · , u(M)] and u ∈ {gs,ω}. In simple words the objective function will be
maximized when the vector composed of those variables lies in the direction of [gs,(m+1), · · · , gs,(M)]t vector.
Therefore, we have to find the optimal scaling factor (λm) for those variables. Now by replacing the first m ordered
variables by their respective upper bounds and rest of them by a scaled vector of gs,{(m+1),·,(M)} we obtain
following optimization problem in terms of λm.
max
λm
1 + (pm+smλm)
2
1+qm+smλ2m
1 + α
2(pm+smλm)2
1+α2qm+α2smλ2m
The solution to the above problem can be calculated by solving the following 4th degree polynomial P (λm).
λ4m +
pm(2 + 3γssm)
sm(1 + γssm)
λ3m +
3p2mγs
sm(1 + γssm)
λ2m+
pm(γsp
2
mα
2 + 2qmα
2 + α2 + 1)
s2α2(1 + γssm)
λm − (1 + qm)(1 + α
2qm)
s2α2(1 + γssm)
= 0
Characterization of the roots: As we can see that the co-efficients of the polynomial P (λm) are all positive
except the last one and therefore there is only one variation in sign of co-efficients. Using the Descartes’ rule of
sign the number of positive root has to be one.
Discussion: Based on the number of variables violating their individual constraints we can divide the feasible set in
several non-overlapping subsets. For example, let us assume that the solution obtained using first approach has only
the first variable (after ordering) at its boundary. This is a feasible point for individual constraints also. We denote the
corresponding r as r1. We can write the optimal solution in terms of r1 in following way: ω∗ = gs||gs||r1 =
hs
||hs||r1
and for the first variable ω(1),max =
hs,(1)
||hs|| r1 =⇒ r1 =
||hs||
hs,(1)
ω(1),max =
√
s1
h2
s,(1)
ω2(1),max + q1. Similarly, we can
write rm =
√
sm
h2
s,(m)
ω2(m),max + qm for m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (M−1)} and rM = qM . Now, if we consider r ∈ [rm, rm+1]
region then the start point, i.e. rm indicates that m ordered variables have reached their corresponding boundary
and scaling factor λ = ω(m),maxhs,(m) . On the otherhand at rm+1, (m+ 1)
th variable has just reached its boundary, i.e.
λ =
ω(m+1),max
hs,(m+1)
.
Remark: If 0 ≤ r ≤
√
s1
h2
s,(1)
ω2(1),max + q1, then we can obtain the optimal scaling vector using first approach.
C. General Case with degraded eavesdroppers channels
In this subsection we evaluate the optimal β vector for two different kind of constraints without imposing any
assumption on channel gains. At first we consider the zero forcing solution where β values are chosen such that
the transmitted signal get canceled at eavesdropper. We formulate a quadratic program with individual constraint
for this scenario. In the subsequent paragraph we formulate an optimization problem with total sum constraint on
9β vector and discuss an iterative approach for calculating the optimal value. It is easy to see that the zero forcing
solution will lower bound the optimum secrecy rate for individual constraint whereas total sum constraint will upper
bound the same.
Zero Forcing for individual constraints: In this approach we equate the SNRe to zero. As a result the equivalent
optimization problem can be written as:
max
β
(
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,d
)2
1 +
M∑
i=1
(βihi,d)2
(13a)
such that
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,k = 0, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} (13b)
− βmax,i ≤ βi ≤ βmax,i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M} (13c)
We can also formulate following quadratic program which can be solved efficiently.
Proposition 2. The optimization problem 13 is equivalent to following quadratic program
max
w
wtw
s.t. H˜ρw =
1
0

Hβw ≤ 0
Proof: It can be shown that the optimal solution does not change if we rewrite the objective function as
min
1+
M∑
i=1
(βihi,d)
2
(
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,d
)2 , because M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,d 6= 0. If we consider a new variable v such that
M∑
i=1
hs,iβihi,d = v,
then in terms of variable vector z = [ωv
t, 1v ], we can easily write a quadratic optimization problem, where ωi =
hi,dβi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. The denominator of the objective function (13a) can be written as a constraint in terms
of this variable vector as, [hts, 0]w = 1. We consider two new parameters ρi,k =
hi,k
hi,d
, ∀i and hsik = hs,iρi,k, ∀i.
We then define matrix Hρ such that (Hρ)k,i = hsik, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} and ∀k and (Hρ)k,M+1 = 0, ∀k. H˜ρ is
generated by concatenating the constraint due to denominator and eavesdroppers. Hβ can be obtained by rearranging
the following constraint: −hd,iβi,maxwM+1 ≤ wi ≤ hd,iβi,maxwM+1,∀i
Optimal Secrecy rate for total Sum Constraint: From equation (8) we can rewrite the equivalent optimization
problem in following manner:
max
η
max
β
1 + SNRd(β)
1 + η
s.t. SNRk(β) ≤ η, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
βtβ ≤ βtot
10
Our Approach: This problem becomes a single dimensional optimization problem if we know the solution of
inner optimization problem for a fixed η. Then we can search over the range of η for the optimum η at which
the maximum objective function value is attained. We can use bi-section algorithm to find the optimal η and the
corresponding optimum decision variable β.
Range of η: As η = 0 will result in sub-optimal zero-forcing solution, so we can start with small values of η,
typically in the range of 10−6. The upper bound on η can be calculated by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
β
(hts,kβ)
2
1 + βtDkβ
(14a)
s.t. βtβ ≤ βtot (14b)
hs,k = [hs,1h1,k, hs,2h2,k, · · · , hs,MhM,k]t, Dk = diag(h21,k, h22,k, · · · , h2M,k) ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}. The solution
of this problem is ηk,max = hs,ktD˜−1k hs,k, where D˜k =
1
βtot
I+Dk and ηmax = max
k
ηk,max.
We consider the following transformation for converting the non-convex problem into a convex one.
ωi = βihi,d, and vi =
ωi√
1 +
M∑
i=1
ω2i
(15a)
or compactly v =
ω√
1 + ωtω
⇔ ω = v√
1− vtv (15b)
• Objective function: For a fixed η our objective is to maximize (
M∑
i=1
hs,ivi)
2 or equivalently vthshtsv.
• Eavesdroppers constraint: From equation (9) eavesdroppers’ SNR constraints can be written as:
SNRk =
(hts,kβ)
2
1 + βtdiag(hk)β
Ps
σ2
≤ η, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}
Using the same transformation on the SNR constraint due to eavesdropper we get:
ωt(hsρ,kh
t
sρ,k)ω
1 + ωtDρkω
Ps
σ2
≤ η
where hsρk = [hs,1ρ1,k, hs,2ρ2,k, · · · , hs,MρM,k]t,Dρk = diag([ρ21,k, ρ22,k, · · · , ρ2M,k]) and ρi,k = hi,khi,d , ∀i
We transform the above expression in terms of v and rearrange it to obtain:
vtCk(η)v ≤ 1 where Ck(η) =
hsρkh
t
sρk
η
Ps
σ2
+ I−Dρk
If ρi,k =
hi,k
hi,d
, ∀i, k then I−Dρk is a diagonal matrix with positive entries, therefore, Ck is a positive definite
matrix.
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• Total Constraint: Total constraint can be written in the following vector notations:
M∑
i=1
β2i ≤ βtot
=⇒
M∑
i=1
ω2i
h2i,d
≤ βtot
=⇒
M∑
i=1
v2i
h2i,d(1−
M∑
i=1
v2i )
≤ βtot
=⇒
M∑
i=1
(1 +
1
h2i,dβtot
)v2i ≤ 1
or vtDTv ≤ 1 where DT = diag([(1 + 1
h2i,dβtot
),∀i])
As hs,i > 0, ∀i and the constraints are quadratic in nature, so we claim that we can replace the quadratic objective
function by a linear one i.e., htsv. Though maximum value of (h
t
sv)
2 for the given constraints can be obtained
by finding the maximum and minimum value of linear objective htsv for those same constraints, but those values
will be indeed same. We can argue that using contradiction. Let us assume that the solutions of maximization and
minimization problem are v̂∗ and v˜∗, respectively. Now, if htsv̂
∗ < |htsv˜∗|, then we can find a vector −v˜∗ which
will not only satisfy the constraints but also has higher objective function value than v̂∗. Hence, v̂∗ cannot be
optimum. Similar argument can be presented for minimization problem also and thus it proves our claim.
For a fixed η the reformulated optimization problem becomes:
max
x
htsv (16a)
s.t. vtCk(η)v ≤ 1, k ∈ {1, 2, . . .K} (16b)
vtDTv ≤ 1 (16c)
Now, it is easy to see that vtDTv ≤ 1 is a M dimensional ellipsoid, also, Ck(η), k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} are positive
semidefinite symmetric matrix. Hence, this is a convex optimization problem and therefore global solution can be
obtained using numerical routines. Once the optimal solution for a particular η is obtained, then we can calculate
corresponding secrecy rate by evaluating 1+(h
t
sv
∗
(η))2
1+η . Now, we use any line search method to calculate optimal
η∗ due to following proposition. We have used golden-section search for generating the results.
Proposition 3. 1+(h
t
sv
∗
(η))2
1+η is an unimodal function of η in the range [0,∞)
Proof: For lower values of η, eavesdroppers’ constraints of optimization problem (16) are dominating and as η
increases, so the volume of ellipsoids corresponding to those constraints. This results in enlargement of the feasible
region, which causes increment in the objective function value of problem (16). Therefore, for values around η = 0,
1+(htsv
∗
(η))2
1+η increases with η. For higher values of η, v
tDTv ≤ 1 is dominating constraint and objective function
value become constant for those values of η. So, as η increases objective function starts decreasing. Hence, there
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is an intermediate point where 1+(h
t
sv
∗
(η))2
1+η reaches maximum value.
In the following subsection we discuss the single eavesdropper scenario with sum relay constraint and characterize
the solution of secrecy rate maximization problem.
Characterization of Solution for single eavesdropper scenario
• Case 1: If λmin(C) is the minimum eigen value of matrix C or D then as long the maximum eigen value of
λmax(DT) < λmin(C), the constraint xtDTx ≤ 1 will be inactive and hence we are left with maximization
of quadratic objective with a quadratic equality constraint. This is indeed generalized Rayleigh-quotient [23,
p. 176] and the solution of this problem can be easily obtained by calculating the eigen vector corresponding
to maximum eigen value of the matrix C(η)−1hshst. To calculate the eigen value of the matrix we can solve
the following equation:
C(η)−1hshtsv = λv
As hstv is a scalar, then C(η)−1hs indeed lies in the direction of v and infact by neglecting scale factor we
can write v = C(η)−1hs. Therefore, for this fixed η the secrecy objective function becomes:
Rs(η) =
1 + htsC(η)
−1hs
1 + η
• Case 2: When the criteria mentioned above is not satisfied then both the constraints might be active, so we
use following two step approach:
– We solve the problem considering the first constraint only. If the solution obtained (x∗) satisfy the second
constraint then this is the solution else we discard it and follow the next step.
– In this case both the constraints are active and we have to solve the following problem.
max
x
xthsh
t
sx (17a)
s.t. xTC(η)x = 1 (17b)
xtDTx = 1 (17c)
Now for this problem we can use any suitable numerical routine to find the global optimum which should satisfy
the criteria mentioned in [21].
Optimal Secrecy rate for individual relay constraints
The objective function and eavesdroppers’ constraints remain same as it was for total relay constraint scenario.
But, unlike the previous case, instead of single relay constraint we have M relay constraints corresponding to each
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of the relay nodes. The individual relay constraint and the transformed one is presented below: :
β2i =
ω2i
h2i,d
=
v2i
h2i,d(1− vtv)
≤ β2i,max, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}
=⇒ vtv + v
2
i
h2i,dβ
2
i,max
≤ 1 or vtDiv ≤ 1
where (Di)jk =

1 +
v2i
h2i,dβ
2
i,max
, if k = j = i
1, if k = j 6= i
0, otherwise
We can upper bound the ηk,max, ∀k in this scenario by using the solution of optimization problem (14). We use
βtot =
M∑
i=1
β2i,max in this case to evaluate the upper bound of ηk,max, thereafter to be denoted as η̂k,max, ∀k.
Similarly, η̂max = max
k
η̂k,max. The inner optimization problem for a fixed η can be written as:
max
v
htsv (18a)
such that vtCk(η)v ≤ 1, k ∈ {1, 2, . . .K} (18b)
vtDiv ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .M} (18c)
Similar argument for unimodularity of 1+(h
t
sv
∗
(η))2
1+η as function of η within the range [0, η̂max] can be presented
in this case also. Hence, by using golden-section search we can obtain optimal η∗ and thereby optimal β∗ for
individual relay constraint scenario with multiple eavesdroppers.
Convergence and Iterations: The f(η) = 1+(h
T
s x
∗)2
1+η is a continuous function of η within the interval [0, ηmax],
where x∗ is the optimal solution of problem (16). Also, it is well known that for golden-section search method [?
, chap. 2.1] after n iterations the updated interval can be written as:
η(n)u − η(n)l = τnηmax and η∗ ∈ [η(n)l , η(n)u ]
where τ = 0.618. In other words (η(n)u − η∗) ≤ τnηmax and (η∗ − η(n)l ) ≤ τnηmax and therefore the sequence
{η(n)l }∞n=1 and {η(n)u }∞n=1 linearly converges to η∗ [24].
If we consider a tolerance parameter δ, we can easily estimate the number of the iterations required.
τNηmax ≤ δ =⇒ N ≥ 2.08 ln ηmax
δ
V. RESULTS
For evaluation of secrecy rate we consider a network whose main channel gains are sampled from a Rayleigh
distribution with parameter 0.5. To obtain the degraded channels for eavesdroppers, we multiply the relay to
destination channel gains with the samples from Uniform distribution[0, 1]. We average the results of 100 such
networks while plotting the graphs. In Figure 2 we plot the variation of optimal β value and secrecy rate (Rs) with
respect to source power (Ps) for symmetric network case. As the source power increases the bounds on β value
keep contracting and therefore the optimal β value starts declining. This results in saturation of the secrecy rate. In
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Fig. 2. Plot of optimal β and secrecy rate (Rs) with respect to Ps for symmetric network case.
figure 3 we compare the secrecy rate obtained using proposed iterative approach with the optimal solution (solving
(8a) directly using numerical routines) for randomly generated channel values. It is apparent that the outputs of the
proposed iterative are equal to the corresponding optimal values. In Figure 4 we plot the secrecy rate with respect
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Fig. 3. Comparison of secrecy rate (R∗s ) obtained for 5 relay node diamond network with 3 eavesdroppers using iterative approach, direct and
zero-forcing formulation. Here we used Pr = 5, Ps = 1, σ2 = 1.
to source power (Ps) for direct solutions and the solutions obtained using iterative algorithm and zero forcing
approach. The reason behind the shape of these curves is already discussed in context of Figure 2. Figure 5 depicts
variation of secrecy with respect to number of relay nodes deployed. As the number of relay node increases new
paths from source to destinations are available and therefore, by choosing proper scaling factor we can achieve
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Fig. 4. Plot of optimal secrecy rate (R∗s ) vs. source power (Ps) for five (5) relay node diamond network with three (3) eavesdroppers using
iterative approach, direct and zero-forcing formulation. Here we considered Pr = 5 and σ2 = 1
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Fig. 5. Plot of Secrecy rate (R∗s ) vs. No. of relay nodes (M ) for diamond network with three (3) eavesdroppers for iterative approach, direct
and zero-forcing formulation. The parameters used are Pr = 5, Ps = 1, σ2 = 1.
better secrecy rate. This applies for all three schemes (zero forcing, individual constraint and sum constraint) and
is also evident from the plot.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have calculated the optimal scaling vector for two-hop amplify and forward (AF) to obtain the optimum
secrecy rate in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. We begin with considering the special channel conditions
for the diamond network and gradually moved to general scenario. Analytical solution for special channel conditions
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and numerical solution for general scenario is proposed. In future we would like to investigate optimum secrecy
rate of a general AF network. Also, as friendly jamming improves the secrecy rate in several scenarios, we would
like to investigate the impact of jamming on secrecy rate in AF networks.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Wyner, “The Wire-tap Channel,” Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Jan 1975.
[2] B. E. Schein, “Distributed coordination in network information theory,” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2001.
[3] J. Laneman, D. Tse, and G. W. Wornell, “Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and
outage behavior,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 50, no. 12, pp. 3062–3080, 2004.
[4] Y. Zhao, R. Adve, and T. J. Lim, “Improving amplify-and-forward relay networks: Optimal power allocation
versus selection,” in Information Theory, 2006 IEEE International Symposium on, 2006, pp. 1234–1238.
[5] S. Borade, L. Zheng, and R. Gallager, “Amplify-and-forward in wireless relay networks: Rate, diversity, and
network size,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 3302–3318, 2007.
[6] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian Wire-tap Channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, Jul 1978.
[7] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Secure Communication Over Fading Channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2470–2492, 2008.
[8] P. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the Secrecy Capacity of Fading Channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 4687 –4698, Oct. 2008.
[9] P. Parada and R. Blahut, “Secrecy Capacity of SIMO and Slow Fading Channels,” in Proceedings of
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT’05), Sept. 2005, pp. 2152 –2155.
[10] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas i: The misome wiretap channel,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, no. 7, pp. 3088–3104, 2010.
[11] S. Shafiee, N. Liu, and S. Ulukus, “Towards the Secrecy Capacity of the Gaussian MIMO Wire-Tap Channel:
The 2-2-1 Channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 4033 –4039, Sept. 2009.
[12] J. Li and A. P. Petropulu, “Transmitter Optimization for Achieving Secrecy Capacity in Gaussian MIMO
Wiretap Channels,” CoRR, vol. abs/0909.2622, 2009.
[13] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “Cooperative Secrecy: The Relay-Eavesdropper Channel,” in IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory, 2007 (ISIT 2007), Jun 2007, pp. 931–935.
[14] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. Poor, “Improving Wireless Physical Layer Security via Cooperating
Relays,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875 –1888, March 2010.
[15] Lun Dong and Zhu Han and Petropulu, A.P. and Poor, H.V., “Amplify-and-forward based cooperation for
secure wireless communications,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2009. ICASSP 2009. IEEE
International Conference on, 2009, pp. 2613–2616.
17
[16] J. Zhang and M. C. Gursoy, “Collaborative relay beamforming for secrecy,” in Communications (ICC), 2010
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[17] Y. Yang, Q. Li, W.-K. Ma, J. Ge, and P. Ching, “Cooperative Secure Beamforming for AF Relay Networks
With Multiple Eavesdroppers,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 35–38, 2013.
[18] Y. Jing and H. Jafarkhani, “Network beamforming using relays with perfect channel information,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 2499–2517, 2009.
[19] S. Agnihotri, S. Jaggi, and M. Chen, “Amplify-and-forward in wireless relay networks,” in Information Theory
Workshop (ITW), 2011 IEEE, 2011, pp. 311–315.
[20] S. Sarma, S. Shukla, and J. Kuri, “Joint Scheduling & Jamming for Data Secrecy in Wireless Networks,” in
2013 11th International Symposium on Modeling Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, (WiOpt
13), 2013, pp. 248–255.
[21] J. Bar-on and K. Grasse, “Global optimization of a quadratic functional with quadratic equality constraints,”
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 379–386, 1994.
[22] A. Qualizza, P. Belotti, and F. Margot, “Linear Programming Relaxations of Quadratically Constrained
Quadratic Programs,” in Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming, ser. The IMA Volumes in Mathematics and
its Applications, J. Lee and S. Leyffer, Eds. Springer New York, 2012, vol. 154, pp. 407–426.
[23] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Eds., Matrix Analysis. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
[24] D. J. Wilde, Optimum Seeking Methods. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1964, vol. 14.
